



ON THE WAR IN AFRICA

De Bello Africo

Gaius Julius Caesar

Translation of Fatima Immacolata Pretta

Text in English and Latin



eBook
Latin Forum

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Gaius Julius Caesar
On The War In Africa

«Tektime S.r.l.s.»

Caesar G.

On The War In Africa / G. Caesar — «Tektime S.r.l.s.»,

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Gaius Julius Caesar

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CONTENT OF THE BOOK

On the War in Africa

The book contains the english translation and the Latin original of De Bello Africo or Bellum Africo, a work written by a lieutenant of Caesar that narrates the difficult war of 46 BC. in today's Tunisia.

In this volume we added an antefacto that you can find in De Bello Civili of Julius Caesar useful to understand the whole story.

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ON THE WAR IN AFRICA

De Bello Africo

Anonymous officer

of

Gaius Julius Caesar

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Latin forum

Volume 6

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BOOK OPTIMIZED FOR THE BLIND AND BLIND PEOPLE

On the cover a freely inspired image of battle with elephants

PREFACE

If you know the book, you can safely skip the introduction.

AUTHOR

WHAT IS DE BELLO AFRICO

ON THE WAR IN AFRICA
De Bello Africo

Gaius Julius Caesar
English text

PROLOGUE

Second book on Civil War

23.

At the same time in Sicily, Caio Scribonio Curione, underestimating the militias of Publio Azzio Varo, left for Africa with only two of the four legions that Caesar had entrusted to him and with only 600 knights; after two days and three nights of navigation he landed in a place called Anguillaria which was 22000 steps (15.5 km) from Clupea, which in summer offers a discreet anchorage closed as it is by two high promontories. There, near Clupea was Lucius Caesar (Son) with the 10 warships that had been drawn ashore in Utica after being used against pirates and that Publius Azzio had rearmed for the present war; these, fearing for the greater number of the ships of Caio Scribonio Curione, left the deepest sea and reached the nearest beach with a trireme with protections, and abandoned it on the beach to flee to Adrumeto by land. Adrumeto was defended by C. Considio Longo who had a legion; the other ships of Lucius Caesar, after his escape, also repaired in Adrumeto. The Quaestor Marcio Rufo who was in charge of the 12 warships that Caio Curione had brought from Sicily as escort for the cargo ships; while searching for Lucius Caesar's ships, he saw the trireme abandoned on the shore, towed it and with that prey returned to Caius Scribonius Curio.

24.

Curion sent Marcio Rufo with his ships to Utica while he and the army continued for two days to the Bagrada River, where he left the lieutenant Caio Caninio Rebilo with the legions while he, with the cavalry, continued to Utica to view the camp Cornelius, a place deemed very suitable for the camp. This was a hill overlooking the sea, steep and steep but which nevertheless had a slightly gentler slope on the side facing the city of Utica. From there, in a straight line, the city was just over 1000 steps (750 m), but since there was a source, the sea crept in for a long stretch creating a marshy area of stagnant water, so that to reach the city you had to make a 6 mile (9 Km) wide tour.

25.

Exploring the place, Caio Curione saw the field of Publio Azzio Varo leaning against the city walls at that gate called Belica; it was well protected both by the city walls and by the city theatre which stood in front of the city; its foundations were imposing, which made access to the camp narrow. Upon observing, he realized that the streets were clogged with goods that were brought to the city from the countryside; for fear of possible riots, he then sent his cavalry to prey and plunder. To protect that convoy, Publius Azzio Varus also sent 600 Numidian knights and 4,000 infantrymen from the city, whom King Juba had sent only a few days earlier to help Utica. King Juba had ties of friendship with Pompey, who had been hosted by his father, but at the same time had a deep grudge against Caius Scribonius Curion, who when he was tribune of the plebs had promulgated and tried to pass a law that provided for the confiscation of the kingdom of Juba. The cavalry collided, and in truth the Numidians did not endure the first assault and after losing about 120 of their men took refuge in the field near the city.

At the same time, the warships arrived, Curion ordered to communicate to the approximately 200 cargo ships that were in front of Utica to direct the bow towards the Cornelio field and that he would consider those who had not fulfilled the order as enemy vessels. The intimation had its effect: all the ships laden with supplies for Utica immediately lifted the anchors and headed for their commanded place; all this gave the army a great abundance of everything.

26.

Curione returned to the camp near the Bagrada river where by acclamation of the entire army he was greeted as supreme commander. The following day he led the army near Utica but, while he was still building the camp, the knights of the guard outposts announced that huge cavalry

and infantry reinforcements sent by King Juba were arriving: while on the horizon a large cloud of dust, immediately afterwards the enemy vanguard also appeared. Curione, shaken by this news, immediately sent the cavalry to support the first impact to stop the Numidian advance, while he himself quickly diverted the legions from the works and deployed them in battle order. The knights attacked before the reinforcements of Juba had time to take sides because they were prevented by luggage and by the fact that, not fearing dangers, they marched in broken ranks; so they were put to flight by ours. The enemy cavalry remained almost completely unharmed, fleeing quickly along the coast and taking refuge in the city, but many men of their infantry were killed.

27.

The following night, two centurions scattered along with 22 soldiers from their respective companies fled from the Caio Curione camp and they went to Azzio Varo. These two, whether they sincerely reported to him or pleased him with words he liked - and for that matter we all willingly believe in what we ourselves hope and want, and we think that the others also have our same hopes - reassured him that mind of all that the army was against Curion and that it would have been necessary for armies to have a parliamentary way to express these feelings. Comforted by these speeches, Publius Azzio Varus, the following morning, brought the legions out of the field and deployed them in a not great valley between the two camps, and so did Caius Curion.

28.

In the army of Publius Azzio Varo there was that Sesto Quintilio Varo already seen in Corfinio who, as mentioned above, after being left free by Caesar had come to Africa; now Caius Scribonius Curion was coming to Africa with the legions he had received from Caesar, who had also received them already formed precisely in Corfinio so that these legions, with the exception of a few replaced centurions, had the same centurias with Corfinio's handpieces.

Having the opportunity to speak, Sesto Quintilio Varo went around the ranks of Curione, urging them not to forget the oath made to Domizio Enobarbo and to him when he was their commissioner, and that is not to carry weapons against those who had the same fate and in the siege endured their own evils, and not to fight for those who with contempt called them as deserters. To these words he added few others, with the aim of arousing hope in prizes freely given by him if they had followed him and Publius Azzio Varo.

Despite these speeches, there was no reaction in the army of Curion; thus, both commanders took the army back to their respective camps.

29.

But in the field of Curione a great fear creeps into the hearts of the soldiers and is increased by the speeches between them. Each man made his own conjectures and to those heard by others he added his own. Moreover, when a rumour, even if it started from one, is transferred to another and from these to more people, it ends up that the sources of this rumour seem to be many. It was a civil war waged by a kind of men from whom they can be expected to act according to their feelings; they were legions that until recently had been in the opposing camp ... after all, these changing moods had also benefited Caesar. The town halls themselves were divided into two factions: in fact it was not Marsi and Peligni as in the previous night that made rumours, but speeches by soldiers; too big doubts were accepted as truth. And it was those characters who are used to wanting to appear like the more informed ones, who invented new ones.

30.

As a consequence of these rumours, the war council was assembled to deliberate on the general situation of the army. Some argued that an effort should be made to attack Publius Azzio Varo's camp because idleness was even more harmful to the morale of the soldiers, and that in any case it would be better to die in battle than suffer the torture of being abandoned and betrayed by one's own soldiers. Others proposed to withdraw from the field near Utica at night to take refuge in the Cornelio camp, which was more distant, and use that time to restore the soldiers' disposition, because

anyway from there, if things had taken a bad turn, thanks the great availability of ships could easily have found refuge in Sicily.

31.

Gaius Curion disapproved of both proposals: one lacked courage, the other required too much; one resulted in a shameful escape while the other claimed to fight in an unfavourable position. "With what confidence," he said, "do we trust that we will be able to conquer that field which is extremely protected by the nature of the place and the fortification works? And what could happen to the morale of the soldiers if we give up attacking the field after receiving serious losses? Is not success in battle to favour the benevolence of soldiers towards their leaders and defeat to make them hateful to them? Does the change in the field still cause discontent, if not actually a disorderly escape or at least the loss of all hope? In fact it is not a good thing that good soldiers realize that their leaders do not trust them, let alone that bad soldiers are aware of being feared by leaders because this increases the cheekiness of the latter and takes away the ardour of the former ». And he added "that even if the army's bad temper were true - something that I don't think is true, and if not entirely false, at least greatly exaggerated - it would not be better, however, to conceal and hide our fear without confirming it with the our work? Besides, is it not true that, as is done with the wounds of the body, it is good to keep them hidden so as not to increase the enemy's hopes of victory? Then I leave at midnight, I don't think it's good, because at that time it is easier to betray. And in fact actions of this kind are held back by shame, in addition to the fear of the commanders; and the night is the enemy of both. For these reasons, I do not think we should have the audacity to attack the field without having hopes of victory, but not even enough fear to give it up. I therefore believe that I must examine every possibility and I am confident that I can take the most appropriate decision with you ».

32.

After dissolving the war council, Curion summoned the soldiers to the assembly, reminding them of what had happened to Corfinio, the will that Caesar had seen in them and that, with their help and example, Caesar had been able to occupy a large part of the 'Italy. He told them that "one after the other, all the municipalities have followed you and your example, moreover with good reason; Caesar has expressed very favourable and rather severe opinions about enemies about you. In fact Pompeus, taking the sign of your behaviour, without having been won in battle, left Italy. Cesare entrusted me to your loyalty, and the provinces of Sicily and Africa, very dear to him because without these you cannot defend Rome and Italy. There are those who urge you to rebel against us; what is more desirable for them than in one fell swoop overwhelm us with a wicked gesture and tie you to them? Or what can their anger towards you more than induce you to deceive those who are grateful to you and feel they owe you, to put you in the hands of those who believe they have lost because of you? Have you not heard of Caesar's exploits in Spain? Two fleeing armies, two defeated generals and two subdued provinces; this is what Caesar has done in 40 days. Do you believe that those who could not resist when their forces were intact, can do so now that they are in ruins? And you who followed Caesar when the victory was still uncertain, now that the fate of the war seems decided and you should take the prize of your service, will you follow the wind? They tell of having been abandoned and betrayed by you and remind you of the first oath made to Domizio Enobarbo, but were you to abandon him, or he to abandon you? Is it not true that he abandoned you when you were ready to die for him too? And isn't it still true that it was he who secretly tried to save you? And that then, betrayed by him, you were instead saved by the clemency of Caesar? How could the one who, having thrown away the bundles and the command, fallen as a private prisoner citizen, keep you bound by an oath? Absurd, then, to ask you to despise this new oath to respect what dissolved with the capitulation of the commander, who also lost civil rights.

I believe, however, that you are happy with Caesar but unhappy with me; I do not intend to tell you now about my merits towards you, which are in any case inferior to what I would like and which you expect, but in any case the soldiers usually request the prize of their labours always at the end

of the war and I am sure that you do not even doubt which Sara. But anyway, why should I keep my zeal in fulfilling my duties as commander and my luck in war, given how things are right now? Do you regret that I transported the army here without losing a single ship and that in the first assault we defeated the enemy fleet? That twice in two days he defeated the enemy in a cavalry battle? That he has stolen 200 enemy cargo ships in the port and in the gulf, removing most of their supplies and preventing their supply both by land and by sea? So will you lose this fortune of your commander in the war to follow Corfinio's shame, his escape from Italy, the surrender of Spain, which are signs of how the African war will end? As far as I am concerned, I wanted to be called a soldier of Caesar; you have given me the title of supreme commander, but now you have repented. For you I renounce these benefits; give me back my name, therefore, that you don't seem to have given me this honour to insult me ».

33.

The soldiers, shaken by this speech, interrupted him continuously while he was speaking; it was evident that they could hardly bear the suspicion of treason, then while he was moving away from the assembly, they urged him to have courage and to attack in any place, so that they could show their loyalty and courage. As a consequence of this assembly, having changed the opinion and will of all, with the general consent of Caius Scribonius Curius chose to try his luck in battle as soon as the occasion arose. The next day he took out the army and deployed it in the same place where they had lined up a few days before. Even Publius Axtius Varus did not miss an opportunity to provoke the enemies and fight in a favourable position, so he went out with his army and took a stand.

34.

As has been said above, between the two camps there was a valley not very wide but with fairly steep ridges, and both commanders deployed the army in a favourable position waiting for the other's militia to find the ardour to cross it. Meanwhile, on the left side of Publio Azzio Varo you could see all his cavalry, mixed with light infantrymen, descending into the valley; against them, Curione launched his cavalry assisted by two cohorts of Marrucini. The enemy cavalry did not resist at the first impact, and immediately, with a loose bridle, went to take refuge behind the lines; the light infantry, abandoned to itself, was surrounded and annihilated. Azzio Varo's army, facing that side, could see the annihilation of their companions; then Rebilo, already Caesar's lieutenant whom Curione had brought with him from Sicily knowing his great military experience, said: "Curione, look at the enemy: he is terrified! Why do you delay and not take advantage of the occasion?". Then Curione, after having said only a few words to his men to remember what they had promised him the day before, ordered to follow him, and in front of everyone he leapt forward. The valley was so steep that the first ones could advance almost only with the help of their comrades, but Azzio Varo's soldiers, terrified of having seen the escape and the massacre of their comrades, didn't think at all to resist, but they were afraid to find themselves surrounded by the cavalry. So it happened that, before firing a few arrows or our people came to them, the whole of Varo's camp turned its back and sought refuge in its own camp.

35.

During the escape of the enemy army, a Peligno called Fabio who had one of the lowest ranks in the army of Curione, having reached the front ranks of the army of Azzio Varo, began to call him by name out loud as if he were one of his men who wanted to warn him about something or talk to him. Varo, hearing himself called like that several times, stopped and asked him who he was and what he wanted; Fabio drew his sword and threw a blow at Varo's side that if he had scored he would have killed him, but Varo managed to dodge the blow by raising the shield. Fabio, finding himself surrounded by Varo's soldiers who were nearby, was killed.

The gates of the enemy camp were soon obstructed by the multitude of fugitives who tried to escape in a disorderly manner, so that access was prevented. More soldiers died there without any war wounds than in battle or escape, so that they risked being driven from their camp.

Some of ours, continuing the race, headed towards the city, but both the nature of the city defences and the fortifications, in addition to the fact that the soldiers of Curione, armed for battle, were without the necessary tools, could not attack the field. So Curione brought the army back to its camp with all its men unharmed, except for Fabio, while the enemies had about 600 dead and about a thousand wounded. After Curione had abandoned the battlefield, all the wounded and those who pretended to be for fear, took refuge inside the city. Azzio Varo himself, noticing the terror that permeated his men, left a trumpeter and a few tents in the camp to deceive the enemy, around midnight and in silence, brought the entire army back to the city.

36.

The next day Curion began the siege of Utica and the construction of a rampart around it. There were many people in the city who were not accustomed to war, since they had enjoyed a long period of peace; moreover, the Roman citizens were very favourable to Caesar because of some benefits received from him, and the same was true of the other social classes of the city. The two previous battles had generated great terror in the city, so that everyone spoke of surrender, and the citizens treated with Publius Azzio Varo to avoid being too obstinate so as to cause the ruin of all. During these negotiations, messengers of King Juba came to the city to exhort him to defend the city, because he was now near with a great number of troops; the news comforted the upset hearts of the citizens.

37.

The same news had also been announced to Curione, but he found it hard to believe it, and for a time he ignored it, trusting in his good fortune. Curione trusted in the fact that for some time now many letters had been told of Caesar's successes in Spain; therefore he believed that King Juba would not dare to take military action against him. But when he learned from reliable sources that King Juba was less than 25 miles (37 kilometres) away, he abandoned the siege works and took refuge in Cornelius' camp. Here he immediately began to gather wheat and timber, fortify the camp and immediately sent orders to Sicily to send him two more legions and the rest of the cavalry. The place was definitely suitable for waging an all-out war, first of all because of the nature of the place and the way it had been fortified, but also because of its proximity to the sea and the abundance of water and salt that had been brought in large quantities from the nearby salt pans. There was also no lack of timber, provided by the great quantity of trees around, and the wheat with which the fields were full; so Curion, with the consent of all his people, was preparing to wait for the troops he had requested and to drag the war along.

38.

After making this decision he respected this plan of action, but then Curione discovered from some deserters from the city that King Juba had stopped in his kingdom to fight a war with a neighbouring people and to settle some quarrels with the inhabitants of Leptis; only one of his prefects, Saburra, was with a few troops near Utica. Curione, believing recklessly in these sources, changed his plans: he decided to resolve the matter by fighting. In taking these intentions certainly influenced his young age, his great courage, the successes of the previous days and finally the hope of completing the task assigned to him.

Moved by these thoughts, as night fell, he sent all his cavalry against the enemy camp that was located near the Bagrada river. The commander of the camp was that Saburra just mentioned above, but Curione did not know that King Juba was following his prefect and had stopped only 6 miles (9 kilometres). The knights of Curione made that journey at night and swooped unexpectedly onto the Numidians who, following one of their barbaric customs, had laid here and there in disorderly fashion. Assaulted in their sleep, a great number were killed while the others fled in terror. After carrying out this action, the cavalry returned to Curione, leading prisoners there as well.

39.

Caio Curione had left the camp before it was daylight with all the militia, leaving five cohorts at the camp. After advancing for about 6 miles (9 km), he met his cavalry on his way back from

the enterprise that briefed him about it; then he asked the prisoners to tell him who was in charge of the camp at Bagrada. They answered him "Saburra". In his haste to end the journey, he failed to ask the prisoners for further information and, addressing the nearest soldiers, said: "Soldiers, do you see that the words of the prisoners coincide with those of the deserters? The king is far away; he has sent only a few troops that have not even withstood the attack of a few knights, so hurry to your prey, to glory, so that I may as soon as possible already think of your rewards and show you my gratitude. The feat of the knights was truly remarkable, especially when one compares their small number to the multitude of enemies, but as often happens the protagonists themselves remembered that action with too much emphasis and exaggeration, as men often do when speaking of their own merits. In addition to the tales, the mortal remains were displayed and the prisoners exhibited, so that any further delay seemed to be a delay towards victory; so it was that, to Curione's hopes, the soldiers' ardour was added. Curione ordered the cavalry to follow him and then accelerate the march to catch the enemies still terrified and dismayed; but the cavalry, exhausted by the march that lasted all night, could not keep pace and stopped here and there with the men scattered, but even this did not diminish Curione's hopes.

40.

King Juba, informed by Saburra of what had happened during the night, sent him 2000 Gallic and Hispanic knights he normally kept as his bodyguard and that part of his infantry on which he relied most. He himself, along with the rest of the militia and 60 elephants, followed them, albeit at a slower pace. Saburra, trusting in the fact that the Curione himself was approaching as he had sent the cavalry ahead, deployed infantrymen and knights, ordering them to retreat little by little and to pretend fear in retreating: he would give the signal to fight at the most opportune moment and when necessary.

And in fact Curione made the armies descend from the heights to the plain, because in his mind he was even more convinced that the enemies wanted to retreat, an impression that added to the previous ones.

41.

Curione, after having already descended a long way from the heights, since the army had already covered 16 miles (24 kilometres) and was exhausted, decided to stop. Saburra, seeing the move of the Roman, gave the signal to his army, deployed it in battle order and, wandering among his own, urged them to fight; he also kept the infantry in the second line as if he wanted to intimidate with the number, leaving the task to attack his cavalry.

Curione did not fail in his duties as commander and exhorted his men to value every hope of salvation; even the soldiers did not fail in their duty: though tired, the knights, though few remained, did not fail in zeal. And there were a total of 200 of them left, because the others had marched on because they were tired... These very knights went everywhere to attack, forcing their enemies to retreat, but they did not have the strength to chase them, nor could they ask their horses for any more enthusiasm. But the cavalry already managed to surround our ranks on both sides and attack us from behind. Whenever the cohorts attempted a counterattack and disengaged from the ranks, they were isolated, because the Numidians, fresher, immediately avoided contact; when ours tried to return, they were prevented from doing so by their enemies. For this reason there was no security in maintaining position or deployment, nor in trying their luck with an attack. In addition, the enemy ranks continued to increase thanks to the constant contingents sent by King Juba, while our troops were becoming less and less tired, and the wounded could not even leave the line or take refuge in a safe place, since the whole army was now surrounded and held in a vice by the enemy cavalry. Ours desperate to be saved and everyone (as the dying usually do) recommended themselves to their dead relatives, praying that some of them could escape from that danger; fear and panic were everywhere.

42.

Curione understood that his men no longer listened to his exhortations, not even when he begged them to do so, because they were all gripped by terror; given the disastrous situation, he confided that there was only one way of salvation: he ordered all his men to occupy the nearby hills and bring the insignia, but the way was closed to them by the cavalry sent by Saburra, who had occupied them before ours. At this point our people reached the maximum degree of despair; some of them, seeking escape, were killed by the enemy cavalry, others fell to the ground exhausted even though they were not wounded. Gnaeus Domitius, the commander of Curione's cavalry, taking sides around him with a few men, urged him to seek escape and return to the camp, promising not to abandon him. But Curione declared that he would never return to Caesar after he had lost the army he had confidently entrusted to him, and so he chose to die fighting. Only a very few knights were saved from battle, but the others who had stopped in the rearguard to rest, noticing what was happening and the escape of the whole army, managed to return unharmed to the camp, while the infantrymen, from the first to the last man, were all killed.

43.

Having become aware of these facts, Quaestor Marcio Ruffo - who had been left by Curione at Camp Cornelius - urged the soldiers not to lose heart, but they continued to beg him to take them back to Sicily with their ships. Marcio Ruffo promised to do so and gave orders to the commanders of the ships to keep, at the end of the evening, the spears anchored at the lido. The terror of all was so great that everyone spread unfounded things: there were those who said that King Juba's troops were now close by, others claimed that Azzio Varo's legions were already on them and even saw the dust (and yet nothing was happening at all), still others believed that the enemy fleet was coming fast. So, because they were all shaken by fear, it was every man for himself: those on the warships speeded up their departure, and the flight of the warships instigated the commanders of the cargo ships, so that only a few, small boats gathered to perform the task assigned to them. On the shore, there was a crowd to gain a place on the boats; so many sank because they were overweight, while others struggled to approach the shore for fear of following their fate.

44.

For these reasons, only a few soldiers - mostly family fathers - who proved to be influential by authority or pity on the part of others were able to embark; others were able to swim to the ships and thus reach Sicily safely.

The other troops chose to send centurions to Publio Azzio Varo as ambassadors at night and surrendered themselves to him, but the next day King Juba, arriving with his troops and seeing those cohorts in front of the city, publicly declared that he considered them his prey of war and ordered that many of them be killed immediately; the others, those personally chosen by Juba, were sent to his kingdom. Although Azzio Varo complained that this act offended his loyalty, he dared not oppose the will of the Numida king. Juba himself, who entered the city on horseback, followed by several senators - including Servio Sulpicio and Licino Damasippo - in a few days established and ordered what he wanted done in Utica, and after a few days, with all his soldiers, returned to his kingdom.

ON THE WAR IN AFRICA


DE BELLO AFRICO
On the ear in Africa

Gaius Jiulus Caesar
Latin text


Antefacto

De Bello Africo


MAPS




year 52 BC




Year 50 BC




Year 48 BC




Year 47 BC



Year 46 BC



Year 45 BC



Battle of Tapso

NOTES

DBG = De Bello Gallico

DBC = De Bello Civili

DBC AL = De Bello Alexandrino

DBC AF = De Bello Africo

DBC HI = De Bello Hispanico

Characters

A

Achilla - Achillan (Egyptian)

- DBC L3 Chapters 104, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112,

- DBC AL Chap. 4, 26,

- Egyptian General of the first century BC, said by Caesar to be capable and in command of a well-prepared army. Before the outbreak of the war Alexandria, the general was engaged in Pelusio against Cleopatra's militia, after the killing of Pompey and the arrival of Caesar in Egypt will move all troops to Alexandria putting the Roman general in considerable difficulty.

- <https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Achilla>

M. Acilio - M. Acilio (Cesarian)

- DBC L3 Cap 15

- Cesarian Officer

- Not found

- <http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/manio-acilio-glabrione/>

- <https://www.romanoimpero.com/2018/09/marco-acilio-glabrione.html>

Lucius Afranius - Lucius Afranius (Pompeian)

- DBC L1 Cap. 37 to 53, 59 to 76, 83 to 87,

- DBC L2 Chap. 17, 18,

- DBC L3 Chap. 83, 88,

- DBC AF Cap 64, 69, 95,

- DBC HI Cap. 7,

- He was a politician and a Roman general no much loved by the Senate but always loyal to Pompey. He was active in the third war against Mithridates but with poor performance. He was elected Consul in 60 B.C. thanks to Pompey's support but he didn't meet the expectations. He was later Governor in Spain with 3 legions and in 49 BC he faced Caesar. Defeated and pardoned he returned to fight Caesar both in Farsalo and in Africa where he was defeated and executed again.

- [https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucio_Afranio_\(console_60_a.C.\)](https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucio_Afranio_(console_60_a.C.))

Alianus - Alienus - Governor of Sicily in 46 BC.

- DBC AF Chap. 2, 34, 44,

- Governor of Sicily in charge of continuing preparations to bring in the new legions.

- Not found

Androstene - Praetor of Thessaly

DBC L3 Cap 80,

Not found

Titus Ampius Balbo Titus Ampius Balbus (Pompeian)

- DBC L3 Cap 105,

- He was a Roman politician, at the outbreak of the civil war he sided with Pompey, was then pardoned by Caesar.

- https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tito_Ampio_Balbo

Gaius Antonio - C. Antonio (?)

- DBC L3 Chap. 67,

- Roman military.

- Not found

Antonio? (Not identifiable with certainty)

- DBC HI Cap 17, 18,

- He seems to be a well-known person but the text does not specify who he is.

- Not found

Mark Antony - Marcus Antonius (Caesarian)

- DBC L1 Chapters 2, 11, 18,

- DBC L2 Cap. -

- DBC L3 Chapters 4, 10, 24, 26, 29, 30, 34, 40, 46, 65, 89,

- He was a Roman politician and general at the turn of the first century BC. His career remained linked to that of Julius Caesar of whom he was an important lieutenant. In addition to the civil war that opposed Caesar to Pompey, there is his personal story that saw him as the protagonist immediately after the assassination of Caesar with the brief war of Mutina (Modena), the Second Triumvirate followed by a new clash between the Romans. After the elimination of the Caesaricides and the division of the provinces, contrasts arose between the Triumvirates that soon led to the final clash with Octavian. He was the first politician who suffered the cancellation of his name and his effigy from all official acts of the Roman Republic. His political and human story is very interesting and not yet fully understood because of the aura of romanticism that envelops his turbulent relationship with Cleopatra. On Mark Antony and his descendants one can well notice the unjust and moral way of Augustus' government, characteristic before the de facto dictatorships, even if they were not concomitant. Another curiosity is linked to the use of defining a Marcantonio, men with an imposing appearance, which derives precisely from the physical appearance of Mark Antony.

- https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marco_Antonio

D. Eagle (Caesarian)

- DBC AF Caps. 62, 63, 67,

- Roman Military

- Not found

M. Aquinas (Pompeian)

- DBC AF Cap 57, 89,

- Roman Military

- Not found

Clodio Arquetio - Clodio Arguetius (Caesarian)

- FBC HI Cap 10, 23,

- Caesar's lieutenant

- Not found

Ariarate X (10) - Ariarathi X - King of Cappadocia

- DBC AL Cap. 66,

- Maybe it's Ariarate X (10) from Cappadocia

- https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ariarate_X_di_Cappadocia

Ariobarzane II (2) Eusebius (Roman ally)

- DBC AL Chap. 34, 66,

- King of Cappadocia who reigned for a few years.

- https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ariobarzane_II_di_Cappadocia

Ariobarzane III (3) Eusebius - Ariobarzanis (Roman ally)

- DBC L3 Chap. 4,

- DBC AL Cap. 34,

- King of Cappadocia of the first century B.C.

- https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ariobarzane_III_di_Cappadocia

Arsinoe IV (the fourth) Egyptian Princess

- DBC L3 Cap. 112,

- DBC AL Chap. 4, 33,

- Egyptian Princess, Cleopatra's younger sister who in her youth challenged Caesar by actively participating in the Alexandrine War through her advisor Ganymede who gave the Roman general

a hard time. She ended up exiled to Antioch and later killed probably on the orders of the couple Mark Antony, Cleopatra.

- https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arsinoe_IV

Lucio Nonio Asprenate - Asprenas (Caesarian)

- DBC AF Cap 80,

- DBC HI Cap. 10,

- Roman praetor

-

[https://it.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?](https://it.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Lucio_Nonio_Asprenate_(console_36_a.C.)&action=edit&redlink=1)

[title=Lucio_Nonio_Asprenate_\(console_36_a.C.\)&action=edit&redlink=1](https://it.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Lucio_Nonio_Asprenate_(console_36_a.C.)&action=edit&redlink=1)

C. Atheist C. Atheius (Pompeian)

- DBC AF Cap. 89,

- Roman Citizen

- Not found

P. Atrium P. Atrius (Pompeian)

- DBC AF Cap 68, 89,

- Roman Military

- Not found

C. Avienus (Caesarian)

- DBC AF Cap 54,

- Military Tribune of the Tenth Legion

- Not found

B

Luceio Balbo (Cesariano)

- DBC L3 Chap. 19,

- Not found

A. Bebio - A. Baebius (Knight of Asti)

- DBC HI Cap. 26,

- Roman Knight of the city of Asti, Piedmont, Italy

- Not found

Marcus Calpurnio Bibulus - Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus (Pompeian)

- DBC L3 Chap. 5, 7, 8, 14, 15, 18, 110

- He was one of the main opponents of Julius Caesar with whom he found himself sharing the Consulate but without being able to take away his visibility and operational capacity. Supported by Marcus Porcius Cato, he was able to hold other public offices including a governorate of Syria, when he returned he was in the middle of the civil war between Caesar and Pompey. Placed in command of the Adriatic fleet, he made a serious tactical error that would allow Caesar to reach the other coast. Having learned his lesson, he blocked all the Adriatic ports to prevent the arrival of further supplies but in 48 BC he fell ill and died at Corfu.

- https://it.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marco_Calpurnio_Bibulo

Bagud or Bogus, Bogos, Bogud, Bochus - King of Mauritania (Ally of Caesar)

- DBC AL Cap. 59, 60, 62,

- DBC AF Cap 23, 25,

- He is a king of Mauritania allied with Julius Caesar in the war against Pompey. He did not have very important roles in the first part of the civil war, in De Bello Alessandrino he intervened in the dispute between Cassius and Marcellus in a questionable way, while in 45 B.C. in Munda he was decisive in provoking the disbandment of Pompey's son's army.

- <https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bogud>

Tenth Junius Brutus Albinus - Decimus Iunius Brutus Albinus (Caesarian)

- DBC L1 Chap. 36, 56, 57,

- DBC L2 Chapters 3, 5, 6, 22,

- He is one of the most famous characters in history, his fame is closely linked to the murder of Julius Caesar and to a sentence pronounced by Caesar at the point of death. Brutus closely followed Julius Caesar's career, he was with him in Gaul and in the first two years of the civil war, particularly in the siege of Marseilles. Later he moved away a little bit from the flattery of the Senators belonging to the party against Caesar, this because Brutus was the descendant of a very important Roman family that had played a very important role in the passage from the monarchy to the Republic, That's why the conspirators thought it important that he was also at the Ides of March. He would later face the Second Triumvirate and be one of the four protagonists of the battle of Philippi. He is a very complex figure both from a historical and psychological point of view, one can assume that he found himself squeezed between characters capable of manipulating many people.

- https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decimo_Giunio_Bruto_Albinus

C

Quintus Fufio Calenus - Quintus Fufius Calenus (Caesarian)

- DBC L1 Chapter 87,

- DBC L3 Chapters 8, 14, 26, 56, 106,

- DBC AL Chap. 44,

- He was a Roman politician and soldier of the first century B.C. always close to Caesar's positions, he took part both in the war in Spain in 49 B.C. and in the Alexandrine War, he played a fairly important role in the Aegean Sea but did not take part in the Battle of Farsalo. Following Caesar's death he sided with Mark Antony but died before the final battle.

- https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quinto_Fufio_Caleno

Marco Calidio - M. Calidius - Marcus Calidius (politician)

- DBC L1 Cap. 2,

- Probably a Roman senator, held some public office...

- https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marco_Calidio

Cneo Domitius Calvinus - C. Domitius Calvinus - Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus (Caesarian)

- DBC L3 Chapters 34 through 38, 78, 79, 89,

- DBC AL Chap. 9, 34 to 42, 65, 69, 74,

- DBC AF Cap 86, 93,

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